

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SOVIET POLICY TODAY: IS THE COLD WAR OVER?

MANY INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE AND IMPORTANT OPINION-SHAPERS IN THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE, AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD APPEAR TO HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE COLD WAR IS OVER. THEY POINT TO A TONE OF MODERATION NOW DISPLAYED BY THE U.S.S.R.'S RULING GROUP. THEY NOTE THAT ALMOST FIVE YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE LAST MAJOR CRISIS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNITED STATES -- THE CUBAN MISSILE ISSUE. THE RECURRENT PRESSURE FORMERLY APPLIED BY MOSCOW AGAINST THE WESTERN POSITION IN BERLIN HAS BEEN ABSENT IN RECENT YEARS. THE SOVIET VETO IN THE UN DOES NOT SEEM SO LOUD THESE DAYS. SOVIET LEADERS STRESS THEIR DESIRE TO PRODUCE MORE CONSUMER GOODS AND, MORE RECENTLY, EVEN AUTOMOBILES IN QUANTITY. CLEARLY, SO THIS LINE OF THINKING RUNS, THE SOVIETS HAVE WEARIED OF THE COLD WAR, AND ARE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN A DETENTE -- IN A GENUINE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE -- WITH THE WEST.

WHETHER OR NOT THIS PROPOSITION IS VALID IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY SERVICES, AND I WOULD LIKE

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TO EXAMINE THIS PROPOSITION WITH YOU TODAY. IN DO-
ING THIS, I WILL TREAT THE PROBLEM IN THE FOLLOWING
WAY:

1. FIRST, LET US IMAGINE OURSELVES TO BE IN THE
PLACE OF THE U.S.S.R.'S TOP LEADERS, AND APPRAISE THE
WORLD SITUATION FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW.

2. NEXT, KEEPING IN MIND THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE
OF COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR,
LET US LOOK BRIEFLY AT THE STATE OF SOVIET COMMUNIST
DOCTRINE AS IT STANDS AT PRESENT.

3. THEN, LET US REVIEW THE MAIN LINES OF SOVIET
POLICY AT PRESENT AND FOCUS ON WHAT IS GOING ON IN-
SIDE THE U.S.S.R. AND WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING IN VARIOUS
AREAS OF THE WORLD.

4. AND FINALLY, LET US EXAMINE THE TACTICS AND
METHODS THE SOVIETS ARE USING TO IMPLEMENT THEIR POL-
ICY.

I SUBMIT THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL
ANSWER THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE COLD WAR HAS,
IN FACT, ENDED.

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WHAT IS THE SOVIET APPRAISAL OF THE WORLD SITUATION?

WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SOME REAPPRAISAL OF THE WORLD SITUATION, AND OF THE SOVIET POLICIES APPROPRIATE TO IT, HAS DEFINITELY TAKEN PLACE IN MOSCOW IN RECENT YEARS, FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE NOT HAD THE FLAMBOYANT CONFRONTATIONS WHICH MARKED KHRUSHCHEV'S TENURE OF POWER. THE BOASTING AND LOUD THREATS, SUCH AS KHRUSHCHEV'S "WE WILL BURY YOU," HAVE CEASED, OR AT LEAST ARE HEARD ONLY OCCASIONALLY FROM MILITARY RATHER THAN FROM THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

SOME PART OF THIS CHANGE IS OWING TO A DIFFERENCE OF LEADERSHIP STYLE BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND HIS SUCCESSORS. INDEED, THE LATTER JUSTIFIED THEIR COUP AGAINST HIM IN PART ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD A TENDENCY TO "ADVENTURIST" LANGUAGE AND ACTION. AND, SINCE 1964, THE NEW LEADERS HAVE MANIFESTED THE MORE SOBER, RESTRAINED, AND "BUSINESS-LIKE" STYLE THEY PROMISED.

IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT A NUMBER OF MORE SUBSTANTIAL FACTORS PERSUADED KHRUSHCHEV'S COLLEAGUES THAT HE HAD TO GO, AND THAT A REAPPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET SITUATION AND PROSPECTS WAS IN ORDER. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE FACTORS FORCED THE CONCLUSION THAT "THE RELATION OF FORCES," TO USE THE SOVIET PHRASE,

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WAS LESS FAVORABLE THAN SOVIET LEADERS HAD SUPPOSED. THIS MEANT THAT FOR SOME INTERIM PERIOD SOVIET POLICY HAD TO BE ADJUSTED TO AVOID FRONTAL CHALLENGES TO THE WEST.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962 APPARENTLY PRECIPITATED THIS REAPPRAISAL. PROBABLY THE SOVIETS HAD COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR ACQUISITION OF ICBM'S WAS OVERCOMING, AT LEAST IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE, THE LONG-TIME IMBALANCE IN THEIR STRATEGIC POWER COMPARED WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THEREFORE PERMITTED HIGHER RISKS IN DIRECT CONFRONTATIONS. PERHAPS THEY BELIEVED THAT THE BAY OF PIGS, OR THE REACTIONS OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO THEIR PRESSURES ON BERLIN, SHOWED A WEAKENING OF WILL. IN THE COURSE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THEY FOUND OUT OTHERWISE AND SUFFERED A HUMILIATING REVERSAL. IN ADDITION, THE UNEXPECTEDLY RAPID BUILDUP OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES IN THE EARLY 1960'S UNDERLINED THE MEANING OF THE CUBAN CRISIS: THAT THE U.S. RETAINED A SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING ADVANTAGE IN STRATEGIC POWER, AND THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SHOW MORE CAUTION IN ESTIMATING THE RISKS OF MANEUVERS INVOLVING DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THE U.S.

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THE APPEARANCE, ALSO IN THE EARLY 1960'S, OF SERIOUS INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE U.S.S.R, WAS ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH CALLED FOR A REAPPRAISAL OF THE "RELATION OF FORCES." THE PROPHECY OF KHRUSHCHEV'S EARLY YEARS THAT SOVIET ECONOMIC ADVANCE WOULD "OVERTAKE AND SURPASS" THE CAPITALIST ECONOMIES FADED, AND WITH IT, SOVIET HOPES FOR POLITICAL EFFECTS ON WORLD ATTITUDES. THE SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE BEGAN TO DECLINE, WHILE THAT OF THE US MOVED UP, AND MOST OTHER ADVANCED COUNTRIES SUSTAINED THE RAPID GAINS OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD. IN 1963, THE CRISIS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE FORCED MOSCOW TO DIG INTO ITS GOLD AND LIMITED HARD CURRENCY HOLDINGS TO IMPORT FOOD GRAINS, INSTEAD OF THE MUCH-DESIRED WESTERN MACHINERY. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS WERE OBVIOUS FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP: FIRST, TO THE EXTENT THAT POWER IS MEASURED IN ECONOMIC RESOURCES, THE OUTLOOK WAS UNFAVORABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THUS, SOVIET ECONOMIC GAINS OVER THE WEST WOULD NOT -- FOR SOME TIME -- BE A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR PURPOSES OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL STRUGGLE. SECOND, THE PRIORITY ATTENTION OF THE LEADERSHIP HAD TO BE DEVOTED TO GETTING THE SOVIET ECONOMY BACK

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ON THE RAILS, IF ONLY FOR INTERNAL REASONS HAVING TO DO WITH THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT WHICH LED THE SOVIET LEADERS TO APPRAISE THEIR POSITION AS WEAKER THAN THEY HAD THOUGHT WAS THE SHARP DISCORD WHICH APPEARED WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC. BY 1963 THE SLOW-BURNING QUARREL WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS FINALLY BROKE OUT INTO THE OPEN. MAO CHALLENGED SOVIET CONCEPTS OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND SOVIET CLAIMS TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HIS DISSIDENCE SPREAD TO OTHER PARTIES; EVEN THE COMMUNIST STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EDGE TOWARD SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY. THE SOVIET LEADERS REALIZED THAT THEIR POWER SEEMED SUDDENLY LESS IMPOSING TO A WORLD WHICH HAD LONG BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO SEE MOSCOW PRESIDE OVER A VAST AND MONOLITHIC "BLOC." THEY SAW THAT A DIVIDED COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WAS LESS ABLE TO PURSUE POLICIES AIMED AT EXPANDING COMMUNIST POWER. THIS WAS A SEVERE SHOCK TO SOVIET LEADERS. IN TERMS OF MOSCOW'S POLITICAL VALUES, PRIORITY HAD TO BE GIVEN TO RESTORING COMMUNIST UNITY AND SOVIET AUTHORITY, OR AT LEAST TO CONTAINING THE DAMAGE.

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THERE IS ONE MORE NEGATIVE FACTOR WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS HAD TO ENTER INTO ITS APPRAISAL OF COMMUNIST PROSPECTS. THE BRIGHT HOPES WHICH WERE ENTERTAINED IN THE 50'S FOR THE SPREAD OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD, PERHAPS EVEN FOR ACTUAL SEIZURES OF POWER IN SOME COUNTRIES, PROVED PREMATURE. REVERSES WERE ENCOUNTERED IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES WHERE PROSPECTS HAD ONCE SEEMED GOOD -- FOR EXAMPLE, IN IRAQ, INDONESIA, GHANA, AND ALGERIA. CHINESE DISRUPTION OF COMMUNIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST FORCES DIMMED PROSPECTS IN MANY COUNTRIES. CASTRO'S ATTEMPTS TO SPONSOR IMITATORS IN LATIN AMERICA CAME TO LITTLE. AFRICA SEEMED A LESS PROMISING REVOLUTIONARY TERRAIN THAN IT HAD ABOUT 1960. THE GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED STATES, WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED TO ASSOCIATE WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC AGAINST THE WEST, BROKE DOWN IN CONSEQUENCE OF REGIONAL QUARRELS. THE SOVIETS WERE EVIDENTLY OBLIGED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE FORCES AT WORK IN THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WERE MORE COMPLICATED THAN THEY HAD SUPPOSED. IF THE DEVELOPMENTS FAVORABLE TO THEIR INTERESTS WHICH THEY HAD FORESEEN WERE TO COME AT ALL, THIS COULD ONLY BE OVER A MUCH LONGER PERIOD.

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THUS A NUMBER OF FACTORS HAVE COMBINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS TO REDUCE SOVIET EXPECTATIONS. THESE FACTORS HAVE BEEN SERIOUS ENOUGH TO COMPEL A REAPPRAISAL OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES ON THE WORLD SCENE, AND TO DEMAND ALTERATION OF SOVIET POLICIES. HOW FUNDAMENTALLY HAVE THE SOVIETS REACTED TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS? SOME PEOPLE THINK FUNDAMENTALLY ENOUGH TO MAKE POSSIBLE A NEW STAGE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ONE WHICH COULD BRING A GENUINE TRUCE ON ALL THOSE MANY FRONTS AROUND THE WORLD WHERE COLD WAR HAS BEEN WAGED. ON THE CONTRARY, I BELIEVE, FOR REASONS I WILL SET FORTH, THAT WHAT HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IS MERELY A TACTICAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE KIND OFTEN BEFORE SEEN IN SOVIET POLICY, AND THAT NO REALLY SIGNIFICANT MOVES TOWARD TERMINATING THE COLD WAR ARE IN SIGHT.

LET US LOOK AT THE STATE OF SOVIET DOCTRINE

IF WE EXAMINE WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SAYING IN THEIR DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN RECENT YEARS, NO EVIDENCE OF ANY REAL WILL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US IS MANIFEST. IF ANYTHING, THE HOSTILITY

AND CALUMNY POURED OUT BY THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MILL ARE MORE SHRILL THAN EVER. BREZHNEV HAS DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO WORK FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS DESPITE THE VIETNAM WAR REFLECTS "A STRANGE AND PERSISTENT DELUSION."

IT IS SAID THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL OBLIGED TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY TOWARD A COMMUNIST ALLY, BUT THEIR WHOLE COURSE OF ACTION TOWARD THE VIETNAM PROBLEM SINCE KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER IN 1964 INDICATES THAT THEY WOULD RATHER SEE THE WAR CONTINUE THAN SEE IT END ON OTHER THAN HANOI'S TERMS. SOME SAY THAT COMMUNIST POLEMICS AND PROPAGANDA ARE NECESSARY PROPS TO THE SOVIET REGIME. OTHERS SAY THAT EVEN IF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE WEST CHANGED, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE REVOLUTIONARY STATEMENTS USED AT PARTY CONGRESSES AND OTHER MEETINGS TO CHANGE. PERHAPS, BUT IN THE PAST THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS ALWAYS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY CLEVER TO DEVISE SIGNALS OF ITS CHANGE IN INTENTIONS DESPITE THIS HANDICAP.

THERE IS AN EASIER EXPLANATION OF WHY THOSE IN THE WEST WHO BELIEVE IN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR

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DETENTE FIND SO LITTLE SUPPORT IN OFFICIAL SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS. IT IS JUST THIS: THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT MADE A SIMPLE DECISION TO END THE COLD WAR. THEY HAVE REACTED IN A MORE COMPLICATED WAY TO THE DISCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT YEARS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THEY HAVE DONE WHAT MEN SCHOOLED ALL THEIR LIVES IN LOOKING AT POLITICAL REALITIES IN MARXIST-LENINIST TERMS COULD BE EXPECTED. THEY HAVE NOT ABANDONED THEIR DOCTRINAL PREMISES, BUT THEY HAVE STRETCHED THE TIME FRAME OF THEIR EXPECTATIONS. THEY HAVE MODIFIED THEIR POLICIES TO THE CURRENT REALITIES OF POWER.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES OF SOVIET DOCTRINE REMAIN. AS SEEN IN SOVIET EYES, AMERICAN STRATEGIC POWER IS A THREAT, AND IT IS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO COMMUNIST ADVANCE. MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER IN WESTERN SOCIETY IS FRAGILE, AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WILL FINALLY BREAK DOWN. THEY EXPECT THAT IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA, REVOLUTIONARY TURBULENCE WILL MOUNT, AND COMMUNIST OPPORTUNITIES FOR INFLUENCE AND POWER

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WILL EVENTUALLY IMPROVE. AS SEEN BY SOVIET LEADERS, COMMUNIST UNITY CAN AND MUST BE RESTORED AGAINST THE DAY WHEN HISTORY LURCHES FORWARD ONCE AGAIN ON ITS INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONARY COURSE. THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD MARXIST-LENINIST "SCIENCE" AS THE ONLY SURE GUIDE IN THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WHICH, ACCORDING TO THEIR COMMUNIST FAITH, THE VERY NATURE OF HUMAN SOCIETY IMPOSES.

IN THE WEST, MOST PEOPLE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CREDIT THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY BELIEVE WHAT THEIR DOCTRINE SAYS, OR THAT THEIR ACTION AT LEAST IS ACTUALLY RELATED TO IT. THE COMMUNIST TRUE BELIEVER IS ALWAYS INCREDIBLE TO THE WESTERN, PRAGMATIC UNBELIEVER. BUT IT HARD TO DENY THAT IF THE SOVIET LEADERS DID NOT CONTINUE TO BELIEVE MOST OF WHAT THEIR SCRIPTURES SAY, THEY WOULD, EVEN AS A GREAT POWER WITH INTERESTS AND SECURITY TO DEFEND, PURSUE A DIFFERENT COURSE IN WORLD POLITICS. EXCEPT FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AS A STATE COULD BE SERVED BY MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. IF, AS SOME SAY, DOCTRINE IS

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BECOMING IRRELEVANT TO SOVIET CONDUCT, IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE BY NOW TO CITE SOME SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET POLICY WHICH MAKES THIS MANIFEST. IN FACT, WHAT THE SOVIETS ACTUALLY DO REMAINS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE.

THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT CHANGE IN THE OUTLOOK AND ACTION OF A DOCTRINAIRE REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM CANNOT TAKE PLACE. HISTORY SAYS OTHERWISE. WE HAVE SEEN CHANGES IN EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND, EARLIER, IN THE MOSLEM WORLD. BUT HISTORY ALSO SAYS THAT SUCH CHANGE USUALLY TAKES A VERY LONG TIME, AND THIS SEEMS THE MORE LIKELY IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY WHERE FOR CENTURIES THE CRITICAL SPIRIT HAS BEEN UNWELCOME AND ARBITRARY POWER HAS BEEN THE RULE. IN ADDITION, THE COMMUNIST BELIEFS HAVE IN 50 YEARS BECOME A POWERFUL CEMENT THAT HELPS TO HOLD UP THE SOVIET UNION'S PRESENT STRUCTURE OF POWER. TO PERMIT THIS CEMENT TO CRUMBLE MIGHT TOPPLE THE WHOLE APPARATUS WHICH THE COMMUNIST ELITE RULES.

WHEN THE SOVIETS ADJUST TO A NEW APPRAISAL OF THE WORLD SITUATION, THEREFORE, THEY ALWAYS DO SO

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IN A TACTICAL SENSE, WITHOUT ALTERING THEIR BASIC PREMISES. OR AT LEAST THEY HAVE ACTED THIS WAY UNTIL NOW, AND THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ANYTHING SO DRASTICALLY DANGEROUS OR UNPROMISING ABOUT THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK, AS THEY APPEAR TO SEE IT AT PRESENT, THAT IMPELS THEM TOWARD MORE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. A LOOK AT THE MAIN LINES OF POLICY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ACTUALLY PURSUING APPEARS TO CONFIRM THIS.

LET US EXAMINE THE MAIN LINES OF CURRENT SOVIET POLICY

WITHIN THE USSR, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS OR SO WITH ECONOMIC REFORM SCHEMES INTENDED TO RESTORE THE HIGH RATES OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH THE ECONOMY ENJOYED EARLIER. SIMILARLY, IN AGRICULTURE, BOLD NEW DEPARTURES HAVE BEEN OUTLINED TO OVERCOME STAGNATION IN OUTPUT.

THE SIGNIFICANT THING HERE, HOWEVER, IS THAT NO CONSIDERATION HAS APPARENTLY BEEN GIVEN BY SOVIET LEADERS TO RE-ALLOCATING THE VAST RESOURCES TAKEN BY THEIR MILITARY PROGRAMS. IF MORE RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH AS SUCH WERE DESIRED, THE BEST RESULTS COULD BE OBTAINED BY HEAVIER INVESTMENTS IN THE CONSUMER

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GOODS INDUSTRIES. INSTEAD, THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN A RAPID BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCES.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS REMAIN COOL TO ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL, THOUGH FOR POLITICAL REASONS THEY CONTINUE THE ROUND-AND-ROUND AT GENEVA. IT REMAINS TRUE THAT OVER THE YEARS, ALL THE CONCRETE INITIATIVES TO SLOW DOWN THE ARMS RACE HAVE COME FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE ONLY. IF THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN THIS FIELD, EVEN AT A TIME OF SOME ECONOMIC STRINGENCY IN THE U.S.S.R. IT SEEMS A FAIR INFERENCE THAT SOVIET POLICY IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE POWER COMPETITION HAS TO CONTINUE.

ON THE QUESTION OF VIETNAM, THE SOVIETS' ATTITUDE HAS BEEN COMPLICATED. THEY APPARENTLY HAD NO PART IN HANOI'S ORIGINAL DECISION TO RESORT TO ARMED ACTION. KHRUSHCHEV SEEMED INCLINED TO HAVE THE U.S.S.R. STAND ASIDE, BUT THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE MATTERS THAT LED TO HIS OUSTER. THE NEW LEADERS AT ONCE REINJECTED THEMSELVES, PROBABLY CALCULATING THAT THE RISKS WERE LIMITED AND THE POTENTIAL GAINS SUBSTANTIAL. THEY HOPED TO RE-ESTABLISH COMMUNIST BLOC UNITY AND TO

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VINDICATE THEIR CLAIMS TO LEADERSHIP. AND THEY WANTED TO BE PARTY TO AN ACTION WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. LACKED THE CAPACITY AND WILL TO PREVENT A FORWARD MOVEMENT OF COMMUNIST FORCES APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF "NATIONAL LIBERATION" WARFARE.

THE SOVIET POSITION NOW IS THAT THE VIETNAM WAR PREVENTS DETENTE. BUT IT WAS THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP WHICH MADE THE CHOICE IN 1964 TO SUPPORT HANOI ACTIVELY, AT A TIME WHEN, IN THE WAKE OF THE TEST BAN TREATY, HOPES IN THE WEST FOR DETENTE WERE NEVER HIGHER. SINCE THEN, SOVIET WEAPONS AND MATERIEL HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE AMERICAN LOSSES IN VIETNAM, AND THE U.S.S.R. GIVES NO CONVINCING SIGN AS YET OF ANY DESIRE TO INFLUENCE HANOI TO SEEK A REASONABLE PEACE. IN THIS AS IN OTHER MATTERS, THE PRIORITY IN SOVIET POLICY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CONTINUED STRUGGLE RATHER THAN TO DETENTE.

THIS IS MANIFEST ALSO IN THE POLITICAL USE THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE OF THE WAR. THEIR DIPLOMATIC

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AND PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO ISOLATE THE U.S. FROM ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS OVER THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN INTENSE. LET US NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THIS EFFORT IS WORTHY OF THE WORST PHASES OF THE COLD WAR.

IN EUROPE THE VIETNAM WAR AND UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE FUTURE OF NATO HAVE PROVIDED THE SOVIETS AN OPENING IN THIS AREA, AND THEY HAVE HAD A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE GOING FOR THE LAST YEAR. HERE THE THEME IS DETENTE, BUT OF A SPECIAL SORT. THE AIM IS TO RELAX THE EUROPEANS INTO BELIEVING THAT THEY CAN AFFORD TO DILUTE THEIR TIES WITH THE U.S. THE SOVIETS PROPOSE A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE WITHOUT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION, THE MAIN OBJECTS OF WHICH WOULD BE TO SANCTION A GERMAN SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET VIEWS, AND TO STIGMATIZE AND ISOLATE WEST GERMANY. IF SUCH A CONFERENCE WERE HELD, U.S. INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS IN EUROPE WOULD BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. FORTUNATELY, THAT SEEMS UNLIKELY, BUT THE MANEUVER INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS, FAR FROM SEEKING A STABLE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT, ARE STILL PURSUING THE SAME GOALS IN THE AREA WHERE THE COLD WAR BEGAN MORE THAN TWO DECADES AGO.

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IN THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD, DESPITE THE DIS-
APPOINTMENTS THEY HAVE HAD IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, THE SOVIETS STILL SAY THAT THE GRAND
STRATEGIC KEY TO MAJOR NEW ADVANCES FOR "SOCIALISM"
LIES IN COMMITTING THE POOR NATIONS TO AN ALIGNMENT
WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC AGAINST THE WEST. AND
THEY KEEP PUTTING THEIR MONEY ON THE LINE IN MIL-
ITARY AND ECONOMIC AID AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR BELIEF.
EXTENSIONS OF NEW SOVIET AID IN 1966 WERE EQUAL TO
THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF RECENT YEARS.

THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THIS AID IS STILL
CONCEIVED AS A POLITICAL WARFARE TOOL, RATHER THAN
AS A CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD STABILITY. MUCH OF
IT IS MILITARY GOODS, TO AREAS WHERE TENSIONS
ARE ALREADY HIGH AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS MIGHT BE
STIMULATED. ARMS EXPORTS TO EGYPT CONTINUE WHILE
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION REMAINS A POTENTIAL
TINDERBOX. ARMS SHIPMENT TO INDONESIA ENCOURAGED
THE "CONFRONTATION" OVER MALAYSIA. YOU ARE AWARE
OF OTHER EXAMPLES. THE BULK OF SOVIET AID GOES TO
THE AREAS OF GREATEST STRATEGIC INTEREST TO THE
U.S.S.R., AND TO COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE
THE EVENTUAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS MAY BE THE MOST
PROMISING FOR THEIR BROADER PURPOSES. WESTERN

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PROPOSALS TO LIMIT MILITARY AID HAVE FAILED TO WIN A SOVIET RESPONSE. PROPOSALS THAT THE U.S.S.R. AND WESTERN DONORS SHOULD COOPERATE IN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH AID HAVE BEEN REBUFFED.

ALONG WITH THEIR OFFICIAL AID PROGRAMS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE ON THE USUAL SCALE ALL THEIR OTHER ACTIVITIES AIMED AT DENYING THIRD WORLD AREAS TO WESTERN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE. A VAST PROPAGANDA EFFORT, WHOSE CONTENT AMOUNTS TO A STEADY CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENT POLITICAL WARFARE AGAINST THE WEST, HAS CONTINUED STEADILY. AS ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS CAMPAIGN, THE SOVIETS HAVE PRODUCED OR INSPIRED A NUMBER OF FORGED DOCUMENTS AND STORIES IN INDIA OVER U.S. POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES THERE. THEY INCLUDE A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE WORK OF CIA. THIS SMEAR CAMPAIGN IS INTENDED TO AROUSE INDIAN CONCERN BY BLACKENING THE UNITED STATES AND THUS CREATE FRICTION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIETS ARE USING THE SAME TECHNIQUE IN OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA.

THE APPARATUS OF PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION THROUGH LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN EXPANDING. WHILE ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE

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NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAS APPARENTLY BEEN SPOTTY -- AND THERE HAVE BEEN REVERSES, AS IN GHANA -- THIS IS OWING IN PART AT LEAST TO COUNTERMEASURES BY OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES. THE POINT IS, HOWEVER, THAT THESE SOVIET ACTIVITIES CLEARLY REFLECT THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD IS AN ARENA OF LONG-TERM CONFLICT WITH THE WEST.

IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, THEN, THE SOVIETS ARE PURSUING POLICIES WHICH, ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN ANALYSIS, OFFER NO EARLY PROSPECT OF SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES FOR COMMUNIST POWER. BUT THESE POLICIES ARE ALSO CLEARLY PREDICTED ON THE BELIEF THAT THE STRUGGLE WITH THE WEST MUST CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. THEY APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED MAINLY TO BUILD LONG-TERM ASSETS FOR USE IN THAT STRUGGLE. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THESE POLICIES INDICATE THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS REFER TO DETENTE, THEY IN FACT MEAN A PSEUDO-DETENTE WHICH IS NO MORE THAN A COLD WAR HOLDING ACTION, AGAINST THE DAY WHEN NEW OFFENSIVES ARE POSSIBLE. DETENTE FOR THEM CARRIES NO IMPLICATION OF PERMANENCE, NOR DOES IT MEAN, AS MUCH WESTERN OPINION IMAGINES, A TRUCE WHICH SHOULD BE USED TO MOVE TOWARD ENDING THE WAR.

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WHAT ARE THE TACTICS AND METHODS THE SOVIETS ARE
USING TO IMPLEMENT THEIR POLICIES?

THE PSEUDO-DETENTE HELPS TO ENGENDER A CLIMATE FAVORABLE TO COMMUNIST POLITICAL ACTION TECHNIQUES. IN OPEN SOCIETIES, ANY PLAUSIBLE GESTURES OR WORDS THAT SEEM TO MEAN PEACE AROUSE HOPES AND ALLAY SUSPICIONS; THE PUBLIC MEMORY IS NOTORIOUSLY SHORT, AND VERY FORGIVING. POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH COMMUNISTS BECOMES RESPECTABLE AGAIN. PRESSURES MOUNT ON GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE AN UNDERSTANDING VIEW OF SOVIET POSITIONS ON CONTESTED ISSUES.

A CLIMATE OF THIS SORT EXISTS IN MANY NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TODAY, AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. IT IS FOUND IN SOME QUARTERS IN THIS COUNTRY. IT IS THE RESULT OF A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES -- THE ABSENCE SINCE 1962 OF ANY MAJOR CRISIS CAUSED BY THE U.S.S.R., THE MORE RESTRAINED STYLE OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM, THE CONFUSIONS GENERATED BY FRENCH POLICY -- ALL WORKING TOGETHER AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF WEARINESS WITH THE COLD WAR. AND IT IS A CLIMATE WHICH SOVIET DIPLOMACY, PROPAGANDA, AND SUBVERSION ARE AT WORK TO SUSTAIN AND TO TURN TO ACCOUNT.

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THE METHODS ARE THE CLASSIC COMMUNIST ONES. THE AIM IS TO LAY HANDS ON THE LEVERS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS, SO AS TO CAUSE THEIR ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TO DEVELOP IN DESIRED WAYS. FOR COMMUNISTS OPERATING IN OPEN SOCIETIES, THIS MEANS, APART FROM PENETRATING GOVERNMENTS AND KEY INSTITUTIONS, THE MANIPULATION OF ORGANIZED OPINION AND PRESSURE GROUPS. OBVIOUSLY A CLIMATE WHICH LEADS WIDE SECTORS OF OPINION TO ENTERTAIN ORGANIZED COOPERATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IS HELPFUL TO THESE TACTICS.

THIS IS WHY IN RECENT YEARS, WHEN THE CLIMATE HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE, THE "UNITED FRONT" HAS BEEN THE PREFERRED FORM OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL ACTION. LOOK AT THE FRENCH COMMUNIST TACTICS IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS. OPPORTUNITIES HAVE OPENED UP WHICH WERE UNTHINKABLE WHEN THE COLD WAR WAS COLDER AND THE COMMUNISTS WERE ISOLATED. OF COURSE, THE PRIME PURPOSE OF FRONT ACTIVITY IS TO GIVE SUPPORT TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH CURRENTLY MEANS COMMITTING AS MANY STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANS OF OPINION AS POSSIBLE TO AN ANTI-U.S. POSTURE. THE SOVIETS HOPE, OF COURSE, THAT THE INTERACTION

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OF CRITICAL WORLD OPINION, AND AMERICAN DOMESTIC RESENTMENT OVER BEING OUT OF STEP WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, COULD PUSH US ONTO COURSES MORE TO MOSCOW'S LIKING.

THE RESOURCES AND EFFORT WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE TODAY PUTTING INTO ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE "PRIVATE" INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE GREATER THAN EVER. THE USE OF KGB PERSONNEL, DIRECTED AGENTS, AND COVERT FUNDS PROCEEDS ON STANDARD COLD WAR LINES. FEW GOVERNMENTS AND FEW NATIONAL GROUPS ACTIVE IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD HAVE THE RESOURCES AND KNOW-HOW TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THESE TACTICS, EVEN WHEN THEY REALIZE WHAT IS HAPPENING. IF THE U.S. IS NOT ACTIVE IN THIS FIELD, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET EFFORTS WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE, AND THAT THE PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN POLICY WILL BE MAGNIFIED.

THUS THE CHALLENGE POSED TO AMERICAN INTERESTS AND SECURITY BY THE TACTICS AND METHODS USED IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET POLICY HAS NOT SUBSIDED. IN FACT, WORLD CONDITIONS TODAY, AND THE PARTICULAR VULNERABILITIES TO WHICH AMERICAN POLICY IS NOW EXPOSED, TEND TO MAKE SUCH METHODS MORE RATHER THAN LESS

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EFFECTIVE. THEY WILL NOT BE ABANDONED BY THE U.S.S.R., WHATEVER KIND OR DEGREE OF DETENTE PREVAILS, BECAUSE THEY ARE INHERENT IN THE WHOLE SOVIET THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POLITICS. THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERS OBVIOUSLY BELIEVE THAT THESE METHODS HAVE PROVED THEMSELVES AND ACCOUNT IN LARGE PART FOR THE SUCCESSES OF MOSCOW'S POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY. ONLY A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME ITSELF COULD ALTER THESE ESTABLISHED MODES OF BEHAVIOR.

A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY SHOULD COME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF CHANGES IN THE FACTORS WITHIN THE U.S.S.R. AND IN THE WORLD AT LARGE UPON WHICH SOVIET POLICY IS PREMISED. AS APPRAISED BY THE SOVIETS, OR BY OURSELVES FOR THAT MATTER, THESE FACTORS APPEAR TO BE RELATIVELY CONSTANT FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS AT LEAST. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC POWER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS THIS. I BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO OVERTAKE THE U.S. IN TOTAL STRATEGIC POWER, BUT THEY DO HOPE THEIR GROWING OFFENSIVE STRENGTH WILL INCREASINGLY IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION TO EMPLOY ITS

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MILITARY POWER AT LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT. THUS, WHILE MOSCOW WILL STILL CONTINUE TO AVOID HIGH RISKS OF MAJOR CONFLICT, THE STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH THEY FORESEE DOES NOT REQUIRE THEM TO MODERATE THEIR GENERAL POLICY LINE. INDEED, THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE HIGHER RISKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

IN CONCLUSION, IF THE ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY AND INTENTIONS GIVEN ABOVE IS CORRECT, THEN THE COLD WAR IS FAR FROM OVER. I SUBMIT THAT THE NEED IS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, AND TO COUNTER SOVIET AIMS AND METHODS WITH THE DIFFERENT PROGRAMS, CAPABILITIES AND ASSETS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

TO ILLUSTRATE THE LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM THIS ANALYSIS, I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE FROM A VERSE WRITTEN BY RUDYARD KIPLING. YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH KIPLING'S WRITINGS ABOUT INDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS VERSE IS TITLED, "THE TRUCE OF THE BEAR" AND WAS WRITTEN AS A WARNING TO HIS BRITISH READERS IN 1898 -- A TIME WHEN TZARIST RUSSIA WAS PUSHING DOWN INTO NORTHERN

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PERSIA, AFGHANISTAN AND INTO THE WESTERN REGIONS
OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE. HERE IS KIPLING'S WARNING
WHICH I FEEL DESERVES TO BE HEEDED TODAY.

"BEWARE THE TRUCE OF THE BEAR,
WHEN HE STANDS UP AS PLEADING, IN WAVERING,
MAN-BRUTE GUISE,
WHEN HE VEILS THE HATE AND CUNNING OF HIS
LITTLE, SWINISH EYES;
WHEN HE SHOWS AS SEEKING QUARTER, WITH PAWS
LIKE HANDS IN PRAYER,
THAT IS THE TIME OF PERIL -- THE TIME OF THE
TRUCE OF THE BEAR!"